

THE ECS PRINCE

Baron Sir Sanguinius Incarnadine

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First Chapter

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

Principalities are either hereditary, where a long line of royalty rules in the same lands, with the same laws, and manage the same households which reside in their territory, or they are new.

The new are entirely new, like the lands of Northwatch to the Barons, Dame Mina Vaughn and Sir Sanguinius Incarnadine, or are annexed from other empires or kingdoms from which power is transferred from one prince to another, through politics or arms; as was the case when the founding knights of Galandor, Earl of Altiora, Sir Maximilian des Pegases and his supporters, liberated themselves from the Imperial Society.

Second Chapter

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I say, and many princes who have ruled over hereditary principalities, come to expect little trouble in maintaining these states. These territories are easy to acquire and sustain due to the people who reside within them being accustomed to the laws and traditions upheld by their princes either by necessity or choice. I will warn any such kind of prince to be wary of interfering with these traditions and the people who practice them, as they are the key element to keeping them. A prince who challenges these customs will find his people turned against him. Instead, a prince ruling over a hereditary principality who wishes to steer his lands in other directions should not do it alone, but rather enlist the approval of the Peers.

Hereditary principalities exist only because the princes who rule them obey the laws of their predecessors. These laws, being inherently good, because if they were not the people would rise up and change them, are difficult to alter. The difference between these states and republics is hard to distinguish. If a prince was so inclined, his territory could maintain itself without his presence or leadership, and would thus forfeit himself as a prince and fall into a role amongst the Crown Estates as a republican, as it was true when Treowan Godwinsor, King of Galandor, took the throne wishing to increase the power of his kingdom, but fell short when submitting most of his power to his estates. I do not speak to these princes as they do not need advice, as they take it from whoever gives it, qualified or not.

Princes who keep themselves in their station, not only in name but action, find any action met with resistance by the people but more so by the nobles who hold power within the state. Hereditary principalities have within them two ruling factions, one, the peers who are so because of their dedication and servitude to the state, but not necessarily to the princes of those states, and two, the General Estates, made up of the lords, barons, and counts of the ruling estates from which the prince considers apart of his lands. Actions made by a prince who finds himself with this type of government afforded to him by the nature of these principalities, need to weigh the effectiveness of each ruling body before any action is taken.

The peers, who speak for no one else but themselves, speak louder than the General Estates, for they are the ones who uphold the laws of a prince's land. I will say that whoever maintains the law has greater authority than those who make it. If laws are created through actions taken by a prince that are not favored by the peers, they will have a short life and will be impossible to maintain, for the laws will never be enforced.

The nobles who hold power in the General Estates also tend to speak for themselves, but unlike the peers, their opinions are not their own, which makes laws passed by them even more threatening to a sustainable hereditary principality. I say this because these nobles are granted their station through the people they keep. Whether these nobles truly keep their people is impossible to judge, and thus their agenda can be their own, their people's, or given to them by anyone who wishes to make use of their power, for they themselves hold no more integrity than the people they keep or do not.

It tends to happen that nobles holding power on the General Estates are also peers. In such cases the truths I discussed for both political entities holds true.

A prince who finds his laws before the Crown Estates must have the support of both entities. For this to be true, the law is either one of two laws: it is so minor and not worth the time of the Estates that it is passed along without notice or it is good. Good laws tend to be so because they overturn outdated ones that hold back the prosperity of the people or introduce new precedence that benefit the territory.

If a prince is so cunning and willing, the former of the two laws can be utilized to his own benefit. During the course of the prince's reign, good laws are necessary to maintain his own renown as a good prince, but do him little effort in his own agenda, if such an agenda differs from simply keeping his people. Laws that are minor, or ones that seem to have little effect on the many, thus get passed due to the Estates willingness to keep the favor of their prince, do in fact have little power on their own; but if many of these laws are proposed and passed during his reign, they can work in tandem to benefit him personally.

A prince of this type of principality must submit partial control to his estates to maintain it, for the reason that this is customary and to do otherwise would hurt his state. However, the power he submits to his state will be returned in the form of the state supporting the Prince himself. The portion of his power that is not forfeited to keep his lands and customs should be used to acquire new states, and expand his own.

Third Chapter

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ANNEXED FROM OTHER EMPIRES

Those princes who find themselves with lands ready to be annexed should consider themselves to be blessed with fortune. However, such fortunes come easy and leave in the same manner, as these new principalities are simple to acquire but difficult to maintain.

Such principalities are accustomed to live under their own laws, and if a prince is to change those laws, he will find his new state turned against him. If a prince finds it necessary to impose his laws upon his new state, one of two actions from that state will occur. One, it will rise up and take arms against him; they will leave his lands as quickly

as they came, for they left their former empire for this very reason. Two, it will seek ways to change the laws to best suit its own customs. A prince who opts for the latter, and changes his own laws to keep his new state, will find is hereditary states with disapproval of him, for those states do not approve of change. It is necessary to keep consistent laws throughout all of a prince's lands, to do otherwise would make some state envious of others, thus turning them against one another. A prince finding himself in this situation is at the mercy of his new state, for if he lets his annexed state live under their own laws he does not keep it as he does his hereditary states, thus disunifying his kingdom, but changing their laws, he will lose it.

For these reasons I tell any prince wishing to annex foreign lands once occupied by other empires to do so with great caution. The only way to keep them in the true sense, by eventually joining the ranks as a hereditary state, a prince must utilize a respected member of the state to act as an emissary between him and the annexed land. This entity, referred to as a magistrate, should be chosen by the people of these states, for the people being set in their own customs, will respect laws and changes from his mouth. A prince should keep his magistrate on a short leash, making sure that the prince's wishes are conveyed to the state, for being the visual presence of authority, magistrates can easily sway his people against you, or make them stand by you.

Fourth Chapter

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE CONQUERED FROM OTHER KINGDOMS WITHIN THIS EMPIRE

Throughout the Empire, the epitome of great princes has been defined by those who grow their principalities to such strength that they are able to separate themselves from their encompassing kingdom. These princes, either by fortune or skill, keep their people and states, affording them a future and life lived under their own customs and laws. These princes are seen as liberators, and such princes have the full control of their people.

When the knights of Galandor, Baron Sir Coronada and Earl Sir Jon Dalton with their armies, conquered the lands to the near north, held by the Mundanians, they kept it. For years they kept it under the sovereign lands of Galandor, growing in power and control. When their people, under the control of successive princes to their lineage, grew restless to gain independence from imposing princes from the homeland, the people with support from nobles and leaders separated, forming the Kingdom of Vega.

The prince, who gained his state, either with the pen or sword, keep it with the certainty that his people will keep him; for it is the people he gains the independence. A prince, inherently being free, granted by his station, will find little change in the way he needs to rule to maintain the favor of his people. A principality of this type has already rooted its ceremonies and customs with the people. If this is not true, it is not ready to separate and will find itself rooted in uncertainty and doubt.

These princes, with the future gleaming over the horizon, should not look so far as to fail to see the issues in front of them. The prince should take haste to make tangible the laws of his state, appoint advisors and officers, while minimizing change to the facade of his rule. This facade, not being a false appearance but rather how the people perceive the prince's public influences, must maintain customs that his people practice. The freedom

afforded to a prince's people by these principalities is the liberty gained to practice their ways separate from their former encompassing state, and the prince must be the symbol of this. A prince who leads mirroring the habits of former, now foreign princes, will not keep his people, being marked as a prince subscribing to old ways, out of touch with the people he is to rule.

Fifth Chapter

CONCERNING ENTIRELY NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE CONQUERED FROM THE MUNDANIANS

I say, to those princes who crusade to lands inhabited by the Mundanians, conquering a people who have not lived under the rule any prince, has as many benefits as it does downfalls. The Mundanians are a people not accustomed to the laws or traditions of this empire or others. To conquer and convert these people must be done with haste as well as patience.

Princes-to-be that arrive in these lands either by pilgrimage or crusade should have nothing else in mind other than building an army. The Mundanians are disarmed by their nature; those princes, who arm their people, keep them. Those who are not armed, hearing of a prince's force, will seek to arm themselves, and given the right persuasion, will arm under his name. New armies spread like a disease, and those who immune themselves do so by joining the prince, those who do not, perish.

The difficulty in such actions are acquiring the first few. Like any people, the Mundanians carry with them their own culture, and will not stray from it if the prince is weak and lacks presence. However, to gain presence, he needs these people to join his cause. These princes' roads travel in two distinct directions; in the first and most common fate of these princes, he fails to convert the initial few Mundanians needed to display a proper presence, and thus fades from memory adopting the customs of the people he hoped to conquer. In the second, the prince raises his army, nourishing it, thus causing it to spread and grow in strength.

Those princes who accomplish the latter must decide what customs to instill in his new found people. His army will conquer more, feeding itself naturally, while also providing protection to other interests of the state: economics, ministry, and government. These are the interests that the prince must define in his own vision. Princes that hailed from hereditary states may either draw upon customs from their former state to define their own, or derive new customs that will best keep his people. The Mundanians, not knowing of the culture of the Empire, will look to the prince as their example, and thus adopt the traditions and laws laid down by their conqueror.

Sixth Chapter

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF A PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

A prince is only as strong as his principality, thus his strength is defined by those properties and people his state utilizes. To begin, I must state that a military force should be the primary concern of princes, for it is the entity that wins wars, protects a prince's state, and earns glory for the people it protects. Strong principalities have strong armies.

When the hereditary states of Galandor march north twice a year, in a customary display of strength and fortitude, first by intercepting the Vegans in the dense forests in the northern reaches of their kingdom, and then second, pushing the assault to the walls of the Vegan capital, the army and people of Galandor gain morale and gain pride in the abilities of their generals and princes. Galandorians, by nature and custom, are always on the offensive, taking the battles and wars to their enemies. By doing so, they protect the interests of their people at home, are able to have open borders with no walls.

The Vegans, because of the offensive tendencies of Galandor to the south, act in a defensive manner. Anticipating the invasions, Vega walls their borders, enabling them to make preparations for the wars to come. Never traveling far from their homes, the Vegans are able to support far greater numbers in opposition to the diminished, well traveled, and exhausted Galandorians.

Both kingdoms are strong, but in contrasting manners. However, if it was necessary for one reason or another for the Vegan armies to invade the Galandorian capitals to the south, they would find the terrain ahead unfamiliar. Those armies which are not deployed in the field and are utilized only to defend their homes, will only see battle and gain experience when the battles are brought to them. Thus, I must say it is wiser to keep a prince's armies on the move in the field as long as it can sustain itself. Gaining a familiarity with the terrain, and building endurance and experience, those armies will always be able to take a battle to any field their general wishes to wage war.

Seventh Chapter

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MERCENARIES AND ONE'S OWN

A prince using his military might to either attack foreign lands or to protect his own must do so with his own forces, and not with auxiliaries or mercenaries.

The kingdom of Galandor does not have at its disposal troops to which it can call its own. It must rely on auxiliary troops provided by its estates. These troops hold their allegiance to their estates in higher regards than that of their kingdom, and therefore are considered auxiliaries. These auxiliary troops fight for the glory of their estates, train only with their estate, and only fight when their estate deems it necessary. A prince sending forces to war, are at the mercy of those estates to provide troops. Wars won with auxiliaries gain no glory for the prince, but only glory for his estates; wars lost only exemplify the prince's need for his own troops to wage war.

For if a prince uses his own troops, he will have a united front to which no other force made up of auxiliaries, mercenaries or a mix of both will be able to withstand. Troops that fight under one banner, that of the prince, train together under one general, and fight together with no distinction of estate, can be called the prince's own. A prince who commands his own troops must not rely on the estates to provide for him, and must organize his forces as he sees fit. This direct command over the essential entity that makes all princes great must be utilized, and for any prince who leads a principality lacking his own troops must recruit troops hastily. Though I say that auxiliaries should not be utilized in war, they should be considered good candidates to recruit to a prince's own. For if these auxiliaries are accustomed to fighting under the banner of their estate, if properly persuaded, can easily fight under the banner of their kingdom. I can not say the same for mercenaries.

Mercenaries are a worthless arm. When it suits them, they fight for whoever pays the highest price. They can not be relied upon to make a strong stand on a front, will not integrate into a well disciplined army, wanting to fight together separate from the main unit, and can just as easily fight for the same army a prince's force opposes. These mercenaries do not fight under any banner and can not be trained to fight under the prince's.

Eighth Chapter

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT ON THE ART OF WAR

Princes who do not understand military matters will not have the understanding to choose generals to lead their armies. These princes will be held in contempt by their state; an unarmed prince cannot expect to keep an armed people. If it happens to be that a prince concentrates his efforts in the political realm, he should submit his entire military prowess to his generals and lead them as he does his state. It is not necessary for a prince to keep the favor of his soldiers, though it is favorable that he does, he needs only to keep the favor of his generals. A general must not however, gain more favor from his soldiers than that of the prince, for if he does, a prince must fear the general will turn his soldiers against him. The true nature of all good generals is to take power through arms, and if the prince is seen as a means to gain this power, he must be removed from his position while the prince quickly makes good favor with his armed forces. A prince must avoid being seen as means to this power by choosing loyal generals who have the same agenda as a prince's, and for this to happen a prince must understand war and the means through which war is conducted.

When the political prince, King Thomas II, sent his forces to invade the capital of Vega in Ano Imperium 16, he stood at the front of his troops, acting as a general should. By doing so, he disarmed his general who held the respect of the troops. Though it is glorious for a prince to lead the front line of his forces into war, it is also foolish. A good prince must use his generals to the means through which he assigns them. If a prince is needed on the field of battle to invoke morale to his troops, he has not let his general do his duty, or otherwise his general is not fit to lead. In the case of King Thomas II, having strength in leading his states over that of his armed forces, should have armed his general,

using him as a means to convey his wishes, while the general acted as a voice of the Crown, and visual commander of the soldiers.

Ninth Chapter

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH PRINCES ARE BLAMED OR PRAISED

A prince, being the definitive example of how he wishes his people to act, will act as a “lamp of honor and chivalry.” However, to expect a prince’s preverbal light to illuminate the dark nature of his people would be an obtuse oversight. Whether or not a prince believes humans are born good or contain the choice to become evil, it must be stated that somewhere along life’s path, there do exist evil people. For a prince to contend with these people, he must realize that certain vices that might seem unbecoming of a prince must be used to thwart the undeniable vices of his people. To quote a Mundanian term, he must learn to swim with the sharks. A prince will find himself with the contempt of his people if he does not act upon those who have used their vices to hurt the power of a prince or his state. However, it must be stated that princes who interfere with the Mundanian practices of his people, being seeing as a vice or not, will quickly have his people turned against him. I also must state that the properties and women of his people must be left alone to ensure loyalty and devotion to a prince by his people.

The best way to keep idle and scheming hands away from the prince, is to hold events that entertain his populace. Whether these events are tourneys or feasts, the prince should never endorse any event that has not been well planned out far in advance. A prince is blamed for the lack of control over his autocrats. A poor event aimed at pleasing his people will hurt him more than no event at all. With this truth, I must state that princes should keep a close eye on the autocrats he assigns to propagate his good nature and generosity, for if he plans on attending the celebration himself, he will find he is surrounded by a displeased crowd with all eyes upon him.

It should also be noted that a prince should not underestimate the intelligence of his people, for if too many celebrations are held without purpose, the people will see them as mere annoyances and distractions. A prince should concentrate his efforts on entertaining his people while reiterating the reasons for which he has summoned his people together in merriment.

When a prince’s people are not attending events, they should be kept busy, in a continual effort to increase the renown of his state. His artisans should be encouraged to create goods and monuments, his soldiers ought to continually train while not in the field, and his ministers must continually maintain the governmental duties that allow his state to flourish.

A prince’s people should also be rewarded for their accomplishments. While the virtues, and unavoidably his downfalls, are clear to the people he leads; his people’s deeds often go unnoticed. It is the prince’s duty to reward these people in their efforts to better a prince’s state. However, I must warn princes to not remunerate his people too often nor too sparingly. If a people are rewarded too frequently, they will come to expect the prince to reward them with every little step they take, and when they are not, they will

turn against the prince, questioning his compassion for them. In contrary, if the people are rewarded too sparingly, they will come to the same conclusions. A prince should make it clear to his people that they have a duty to serve their state, and only those who rise above the masses will be considered suitable for recommendations.

Tenth Chapter

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF DURING COURT

Though not discussed by my predecessors or in any official forums, aside from Baron Sir Reinhardt's publication, "On Being Duke," I wish to bring this topic into light. The attitudes displayed during court by a prince directly relates to how his people observing him interpret his policies and himself as their prince. Those princes who wish to joke with his court and make light of those who approach him, will only receive the same in return. In contrary, those princes who take their courts in all due seriousness impart staid reflections of his policies and promote stoicism amongst his people. Though it might be necessary to make a passing joke to keep his court entertained and in attention, it is not suited for a prince to be his own court's jester. If the prince is to be a representation of the kingdom, and those policies and estates that it is made up of, a prince must take those policies and estates seriously, or not expect those who serve him to do so.

Eleventh Chapter

CONCERNING THE OFFICERS OF PRINCES

A prince's officers should be chosen carefully. Any fault or successes they incur will directly reflect on the prince. Thus, a prince must choose officers who are dedicated to their duties and to the prince's state. A prince who has chosen good officers will find that he will need to put little effort towards the way his state is conducted. Left to themselves, good officers will run the state with a watchful eye from their prince, the bad or those who are not watched over by their prince, will undoubtedly falter in their duties. A prince should never take up the stations that should be left to his officers; if a prince does so, he forfeits his attention and energy from those that concern a prince, such as war, Imperial business and the growth of his state. Officers not willing or unable to complete their duties should be replaced without hesitation. If he does not find himself with officers willing to take up the positions, the prince should make it known that their lack of servitude only hurts the state that his people reside and not the prince. With the option of servitude or the dissolve of their state, properly motivated ministers will always choose the former. Because the officers of a prince are the entities that sustain a principality, they should be always in the prince's good fortune, and I may say the best way to make sure of this, is to reward those officers that keep their station in good standing.